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THE U.S. LIFE INSURANCE
INDUSTRYTHE NEXT FIVE YEARS

Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
N e w York, N e w York
[Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission]

I thought I would talk about the challenges for the life insurance
industry over the next few years. I make what is probably a fair
assumption: most of you know more about banking and securities than
you know about life insurance, so I will spend a little time talking about
the way a life insurance company looks to people with a background in
banking and securities.
I spent a week in Japan last month talking to executives at Japanese
life insurance companies. That was an astonishing experience, not only
because of the size and strength of their life insurance industry, but also
because the principal subjects of debate in the Japanese life insurance
industry are exactly the subjects of debate that have occupied the Morin
Center for the past few years. These include the Glass-Steagall Act,'
deregulation of banking,2 and the demutualization of life insurance
companies .3
During the occupation of Japan by the United States, General
McCarthur imposed the Glass-Steagall Act4 on the Japanese financial
-

'See Glass-Steagall: Does It Have a Future in Banking?, 2 ANN.REV.BANKING
L.
51 (1983).
*See St Germain, The Effects of Deregulation on the Structure of Banking, 1 ANN.
REV. BANKING
L. 77 (1982); Cimeno, Jr., The Challenges ofzncreased Regulatory
Supervision: Introduction, 6 ANN. REV. BANKINGL. 223 (1987) (conference
proceedings).
3See Fenske, Going Public: The Critical Choice, in BEST'S REVIEW:LIFE/
HEALTHINSURANCE
EDITION,Jan. 1985, at 28.
4Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
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system.5 Someone apparently told him that mutual life insurance
companies were more democratic than stock companies, so he mutualized
them by fiat in Japan.6 They are now wrestling with exactly the same
issue with which we are wrestling-from, of course, a peculiarly Japanese
angle. For example, in the demutualization debate, the proposal for
demutualization comes not from the life insurance companies, which are
very happy being mutual companies, but from the banks, because the
banks want to demutualize the life insurance companies and then buy
them.' That is more than a sidelight on this discussion, I think, because it
reflects a worldwide trend. If I can coin a double cliche, I would call that
trend the "globalization of the homogenization of financial institutions";
what we are going through is exactly what is going o n all over the world.
What is a life insurance company going to face over the next five
years? In a sense, the life insurance industry is facing the same types of
issues that face other financial institutions. There are three broad
categories: the first set of challenges has to do with marketing and product
differentiation, the second with deregulation and tax policy, and the third
with internationalization. Depending upon one's views of interest rates, I
suppose there could be a fourth, contingent set of challenges that would be
grouped under the rubric of inflation.
Let me begin with marketing and product differentiation. To really
understand these challenges one has to understand what has happened to
the life insurance business. Life insurance companies, as well as life
insurance products, have developed in a way that parallels developments
in the banking and securities industries.
Look a t the insurance distribution system, particularly the career
agency system, which is similar to the distribution system in a retail
securities firm. I spent two years at E. F. Hutton before coming to the
Equitable, and the similarities between them are both extraordinary and
striking. Much of the strength of life insurance companies, particularly
the large mutual life insurance companies, comes from the career agency
system. These companies have an impressive ability to deliver very
sophisticated advice about complex financial products to retail
5See Semkow, Japanese Banking Law: Current Deregulation and Liberalization o f
Domestic and External Financial Transactions, in 17 LAW & POL'Y INT'LBUS. 81,
119 (1985).
6See Murphy, Japan: Land of Rising Opportunity, in BEST'S REVIEW: LIFE/
HEALTH
INSURANCEEDITION,June 1987, at 48.
'See Fenske, supra note 3.
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consumers. Insurance products are not stocks and bonds. Although many
are really not very different from mutual funds, there are major
differences at the point of sale. What the life insurance salesman talks
about with a customer is quite different from what the security salesman
discusses. From the perspective of the management of the life insurance
company, however, the two distribution systems look very much alike.
They are both based on full-time career salesmen; both sales forces are
geographically decentralized and highly independent; they both sell
complex financial products; both salesman are compensated on a
commission basis, which means that they have their eye firmly fixed on
the top line and not the bottom line; and they both present very similar
kinds of challenges to management.
There are also many similarities between life insurance and banking.
The traditional life insurance company is, fundamentally, a financial
intermediary. From this perspective, insurance policies are simply the
liability side of the balance sheet. These liabilities are longer and much
more complex than a bank's deposits, but from the point of view of asset
and liability management, they function in exactly the same way. In that
sense, the life insurance company is no more in the life insurance business
than a bank is in the checking account and C D business. The insurance
sales force gathers assets; that is its fundamental purpose. The company
seeks to profit from the spread between the residue from assets and the
expense of gathering and repaying liabilities. The challenge for a life
insurance company is to match properly those assets and liabilities and
invest them so that the company can satisfy its liabilities and make some
money in the process.
There are, of course, differences between banks and life insurance
companies. Because the liabilities are much longer and much more
complex, the challenge of asset and liability management is more
daunting for a life insurance company. If you make a mistake, it stays with
you for a very long time. Another interesting difference is that a life
insurance company sells liabilities-that is, insurance policies-rather
than assets. Liability products are responsive to customer demand, and
the distribution system is customer driven. Compare that to a bank,
which I would generally regard as asset driven. Banks tend to forecast
loan demand and then decide the best way to fund those loans, since there
are a variety of liabilities available for that purpose. An insurance
company tends to focus on selling its liabilities and then figures out how to
make money on the assets that are gathered.
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Finally, life insurance companies have become very significant
investment managers. There are really two aspects to this business. First,
many large life insurance companies have bought large investment
management firms. Alliance Capital, for example, with more than $40
billion under management, is a subsidiary of the Equitable. More
significantly, the life insurance business itself has become an investment
management business. Inflation caused the development of a series of
investment products lodged within life insurance companies' variable life
and annuity products. These products pass on to the customer the risks
and the benefits of the investment management process. Although the life
insurance company is still an intermediary, it is really compensated on a
fee basis.
What does all of this have to do with marketing and product
differentiation? Simply this: As the products offered by all types of
financial institutions start to fill similar needs, and as each type of
financial institution gains increasing power to offer the products of the
other, financial products start to look like commodities to the customer.
Life insurance companies have traditionally had a high-cost distribution
structure. There is nothing worse than being the high-cost producer in a
commodity business.
There are only two ways to deal with this business crunch, and the life
insurance industry is working on both of them. The first includes
reducing costs. It is extremely difficult, however, to decrease significantly
the cost of a career sales force because the strength of that sales force is its
ability to deliver very sophisticated advice about the complex products
which life insurance companies sell. This strength rests on a substantial
investment in recruiting and training, as well as compensation. If that
investment is drastically cut, there is a risk of eroding service quality. The
second way to address this business crunch is to focus on marketing so that
those high quality services are delivered to people who want them and are
willing to pay a premium for them. I think this is an area in which the life
insurance industry in general has been very weak. Its concepts of market
segmentation are rudimentary and in many cases do not exist at all. As an
industry, its conception of its customer base is quite abstract.
One of the reasons that the life insurance industry has lagged behind
other financial institutions in marketing is that, more than in any other
industry, life insurance companies have tended to identify themselves with
their own products. Instead of thinking in terms of offering products
which meet their customers' long-term financial needs, they tend to think
of themselves as being in the business of meeting their customers' needs
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for life insurance or annuities. It is only a half step, really, from thinking
of yourself as being in the business of filling your customers' needs for life
insurance to thinking of yourself as being in the business of filling your
customers' need for your kind of life insurance. When you do that you
have lost the competitive race. In contrast, if you think in terms of
meeting your customers' needs for financial security, you end up with a
very different set of products, a different marketing strategy, and a
different focus.
Let me turn for a few minutes to the challenges posed by regulation
and tax policy. A principal challenge for life insurance companies is going
to come from further deregulation in banking. The life insurance industry
has adopted the views of other industries in this position: a disbelief that
new entrants into the industry can compete effectively and gain
substantial market share because "they really cannot do it our way." That
was certainly the attitude for many years taken by those in the securities
industry. Although banks have hardly taken over the securities business, I
think there has been a clear demonstration of their ability to gain market
share. Since the market crash of 1987, the inclination of the larger banks
to engage in the securities business has lessened along with the declining
profitability of a securities business.%Accordingly, many of the larger
banks have turned with renewed interest to insurance and, particularly, to
selling i n ~ u r a n c eThis
. ~ renewed interest poses two major questions: are
the banks going to be successful, on the regulatory side, in gaining that
power and, if they are, are they going to be successful in the marketplace?
With respect to the first question, one need only analyze what has
already happened in the last ten years in banking and securities to see that
there is very little reason to expect the movement of banks into the sale of
life insurance to be blocked. There are two events which one might have
looked to as creating a trend toward reregulation: the market crash in
1987 and the current state of the S&L industry. Looking at the market
crash, it is remarkable that it had almost no impact on the GlassSteagalll0 debate or on the pace of deregulation. Its sole impact seems to

'[BAA Says Obtaining New Products and Services First Priority in 1988, 50 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 163 (Feb. 1, 1988).
9~d.

l0Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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have been to get Congress to consider seriously Senator Proxmire's billll
to abolish the Glass-Steagall Act entirely. I would be very surprised if the
market crash had any impact at all on the debate about insurance powers
for banks.
There are many people who believe that the state of the S&L industry
is largely due to the pace at which S&Ls were given new asset powers1* in
order to cope with the disintermediation that arose in the '70s and early
'80s.13 Again, I would be very surprised if that had any impact at all on
the ability of banks to sell life insurance. I do not think that the sale of life
insurance poses any safety and soundness problems. What we are left with
is a simple political fight, largely between the insurance agents and the
banks.14 Generally, my experience with such raw political fights is that
they hold back the tide for a surprisingly long time, but, in the long run,
they cannot stem the pace of change if it makes economic sense.
Although life insurance companies have to prepare for significant
bank entry into their business, there is still the issue of whether banks will
be successful. I think the answer depends on how the issue is framed. At
least in the short run, banks are not going to be successful in developing
the ability to deliver highly individualized, sophisticated advice on
insurance products. Similarly, banks have not been a significant
competitive threat to that sector of the market in the securities business.
O n the other hand, banks will find ways to build on their own competitive
advantages and satisfy a substantial part of their customers7needs for life
insurance; just as the securities industry was able to find insurance
products that fit its competitive advantage neatly.15
The second major regulatory challenge goes to the heart of the way
that life insurance is regulated in America. It concerns the quality of state
regulation. The quality of regulation in many states leaves a great deal to
be desired. The resources devoted to regulating life insurance companies
in virtually every state-even New York, which, I think, is among the
best-are inadequate. The "state guarantee funds," which are analogous

llS. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S3520 (daily ed. Mar.
31, 1988).
12See N. EICHLER,THETHRIFT
DEBACLE64-65 (1989).
131d. at 43.
14See, e.g., OCC Urged Not to Approve Citibank's Application to Underwrite Title
Insurance, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 324 (Feb. 6, 1989).
15See Douglas Bremen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 3, 1988).
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to the FDIC and the FSLIC, are not funds at a11.16 They are a "post
assessment scheme" to cover the cost of insolvency. A life insurance
company that wants to do business in a state must agree to an annual
assessment to cover the cost of insolvency. The charge is based on the
amount of business that the life insurance company conducts in the
state.l7 There is an annual limit on the amount that any individual life
insurance company can be assessed in a state in any given year.18 Those
limits, which are necessary to participation, also render the insurance
funds inadequate.
Some years ago, when I was still in private practice, my firm was
retained by the board of Baldwin-United as it began to collapse.1g The
state guarantee fund for Baldwin-United was in the state of Indiana.20
Baldwin-United had about $9 billion in annuity liabilities and it did not
have enough liquid assets.21 We calculated that it would have taken almost
twenty years for the Indiana State Guarantee Fund to pay fully all of the
Baldwin-United policyholders because of the ceilings on the annual
assessment^.^^ Moreover, the other state that was involved was Arkansas,
and it did not have any guarantee fund at all.*3 It does not take much to
strain this system.
There are consultants-"futurologists"-who
believe that they can
predict future events by counting the lines of newspaper copy devoted to a
given subject; it is a kind of free market approach to predicting the future.
To a casual reader, anyway, there has been a marked increase in the
number of newspaper lines devoted to insurance insolvencies in the last
few years. I do not know what is going to happen, but it would not be
surprising if there were a couple of smaller, but substantial, life insurance
16See Baldwin Case Indicated Flaws in States' Ways of Regulating Insurers, Wall St.
J . , Feb. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
''See, e . g . , PRACTISINGLAW INST., INSOLVENCY AND SOLIDITYOF
INSURANCE
COMPANIES122-23 (Commercial Law and Practice, Concise
Handbook Series No. 416 (1987)).
181d. at 123.
19See Baldwin Case Indicated Flaws in States' Ways of Regulating Insurers, supra
note 16.
201d.
21Davline& Solomon, Baldwin-United Is Forced to File for Chapter 11, Wall St.
J . , Sept. 27, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
22See Baldwin Case Indicated Flaws in States' Ways of Regulating Insurers, supra
note 16.
231d.
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companies that fail, particularly if inflation rears its ugly head again. If a
few life insurance companies valued at $5 to $10 billion fail, that would
really strain the system. Moreover, this is not the best time, as you can
imagine, to go back to Congress and ask for a new insurance fund for life
insurance policyholders. History teaches us that if that were to happen,
there would be very repressive and rigid legislation. The life insurance
industry, which is now only throwing off the shackles of an incredibly rigid
system that grew out of some regulatory problems at the end of the 19th
century,24 would have problems in developing a modern financial
institution. I think a very important challenge for this industry is
managing that difficult process.
Just a word on tax policy. "Tax policy" in the United States has come
to mean "revenue raising policy," and one of the sources of revenue these
days is the life insurance industry. A particularly attractive revenue source
which is not currently taxed to the policyholder is the "inside buildup,"
which is the increase in value in a life insurance policy as premiums are
paid and the money is invested. The comparable increase in value, for
example, is taxed to a mutual fund invest0r.2~There are proposal^,^^ and
there will be proposals again this year, to tax the inside buildup. In my
opinion, this would be very unfortunate, because one of our major
problems in this country is the low level of long-term individual savings.
Virtually the only major sources of long-term individual savings are life
insurance and pension fund savings;27 the life insurance industry plays a
key role in providing long-term capital for pension funds.28 I think a tax
system that discourages long-term savings would be a terrible mistake. It
would be counterproductive because it would sacrifice the long-term
interest of Americans for short-term political gain.
To end, let me say just a word about internationalization. The major
forces that have shaped the financial markets in this country have been the

24SeeMcDowell, Competition as a Regulatory Mechanism in Insurance, 19 CONN.
L. REV 287 (1987).
2 5 S OF~ JOINT
~ ~ COMM.
~
O N TAXATION,lOOTH CONG., 2D SESS.,
AND ISSUES
RELATING
TO THE TAXTREATMENT
REPORTO N BACKGROUND
OF SINGLEPREMIUM
AND OTHERINVESTMENT-ORIENTED
LIFE INSURANCE
25 (Comm. Print 1988).
261d. at 31-40.
271d. at 25.
28Arnt, Gradison: No New Insurer Taxes in NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER
CO.:
LIFE& HEALTH/FINANCIAL
SERVICES
EDITION,Feb. 27, 1989, at 3.
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following: First, the institutionalization of savings, which was basically a
post-World War I1 phenomenon; second, the growth of information
technology; third, rampant inflation in the 1970s and the early 1980s;
fourth, the significantly increased sophistication of individual consumers
of f i n a n c i a l services; a n d finally, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .
Internationalization is the most recent trend and, therefore, the least
understood. I have no doubt' that it is going to change profoundly the
nature of American financial institutions.
For regulatory reasons, American life insurance companies have
really lagged behind the rest of the financial services industry in this area.
Today, a New York insurance company-and
many of the largest
companies are subject to New York law-can only invest ten percent of the
insurer's admitted assets in Canada and one and one-half times the
insurer's reserves outside of North America.Z9 Compare that to the
lending activities of C i t i ~ o r p or
, ~ the
~ fact that the similar limit on a
Japanese life insurance company is thirty percent.31 This is a significant
constraint on the industry that clearly is going to change.
The life insurance industry has been very active about foreign
investing. The Equitable, for example, manages over $2 billion for
Japanese investors, largely in U.S. real estate and through LBO funds.
Furthermore, internationalization is starting to change the liability side of
the business as well. The coming of 1992 in Europe has caused all kinds of
financial institutions, and certainly life insurance companies, to scramble
to get inside the European Community before the grandfathering rights
are set.32 There was a similar scramble to get into the United Kingdom
before it's "Big Bang,,' and the high price many banks and securities
f i r m s h a v e p a i d f o r t h a t process is well k n o w n . 3 3 I t h i n k
internationalization is probably the area of greatest challenge for the life
insurance industry, which has really only put' its toe in the water. Life
insurance is essentially, at least on the liability side, inherently local.

29N.Y. INS. LAW 4 1405(7) (McKinney 1985).
30See Draft Regulation Bans Loan Referral Fees, Reverses Earlier H U D Position, 52
Banking Rep. (BNA) 63 (Jan. 9, 1989).
31SeeJapanese Insurers, BUS. INS., at 28, Jan. 4, 1988.
32See E C 1992, Financial Institutions Policy Will Be Focus of Competitiveness
Council, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1389-90 (June 26, 1989).
33SeeJapanese Securities Industry Opposes Efforts to Eliminate Barriers to Banking, 52
Banking Rep. (BNA) 798 (Apr. 3, 1989).
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There is a great deal of very important strategic thinking that has to be
done to compete on this side of the business.
Finally, I would like to close with a word about inflation. Inflation, as
you know, transformed the financial markets in this country, and it
certainly transformed the life insurance industry. Even the most
traditional life insurance products today-for
example, a whole-life
policy-are now administered in a way that is almost entirely a result of
volatile interest rates. Things have recently started to calm down. I have
complete faith in the Federal Reserve's commitment to deal with the
inflation problem; I have perhaps a little less faith in its complete ability to
do so. It is very clear that if the Fed is not successful, then life insurance
companies, as well as all other financial institutions, are going to spend
much of the next five years dealing with the results of that problem.
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